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r^ COMMON VALUISM FOR BOTH CONSCIENCE
AND CREATIVE POWER
BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND
THE essential valuism of aesthetics may be generally concerned
in our thoughts, feelings, fancies or sentiments in observing or
otherwise experiencing the beautiful, the sublime, the picturesque,
the tragic, pathetic, agreeable, grotesque or exotic. But not in any
valid measure of aesthetic delight or positive appreciative function
does any normal person value ( ?) the ugly, the trifling, the discord-
ant, the decadent and repoussant. Like the ugly or trifling traits in
human cha'-acter, these are negations of the true and positive aes-
thetic experiences and, while etymologically aesthetic as being so
many sensuous perceptions, they are not members to any spiritual
or moral aesthetic because they are not recognized or accepted as
perceptions of any of the qualities which make up the positive, i. e.,
the real, active and creative, aesthetic series. These positive char-
acteristics are real and durable homogeneous and continuous,
whether we approach them empirically or intuitively : imder exami-
nation and validation they are posited as being objective elements in
an objective situation and do not properly belong to the subjective
domain of bare sensory receipt or pleasure.
Any adequate and defensible valuism should start and end with
these positive objective characteristics as its items dc metier, and
only mention the negative subjective characteristics for what they
are as adjectival readings rather than substantial entities. The analy-
sis and understanding of affection and aversion should be the psy-
chological approach to such a valuism because affection and aver-
sion are the two main categories of human aesthesia. The situation
is not altered by trying to reduce our affections and aversions to
terms of volition and conation, for we do not have the will to pur-
sue or avoid, to examine or ignore, without first having recourse
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to whether our feeHngs relative to such an object or end are expres-
sions of afiection or aversion. We recognize and accept the truth
of things anyway more by the way we feel than by the way we
think, and we are anxious to reify only those ideal conceptions which
happen to be congruous with our native desires or needs.
As in any other sphere of inquiry then, the actual pivot on which
the whole valuistic action turns is to be found in man's aiifections
and aversions; and even when the objects of these differ, we also
have only to vary the terminology to suit the difference in the
degree of our feeling for or against any certain external situation or
object. Whence for abstract entities we may have sentiments such
as those for morality, justice, reality, truth ; for friends, relatives or
pet animals, loz'e or affection in the popular sense ; while for our
health, wealth or other material welfare we have only a more or
less serious interest. It is quite apparent that both the object and
the feeling for the object in these cases are positive and affective in
the sense of being relished and sought after ; so then when a feeling
is one of repulsion and we seek to avoid contact with the object
we give them negative names such as /jn-morality, ///-justice, un~
reality, or we call them enemies, beasts, sins, fakes, diseases or
whatever term fits the degree of our aversion. As any sensible man
can see, our personal valuism in these several fields of affection or
aversion is an activity which takes place in ourselves and is directed
tozvard or for the objects, and not in them, as the pseudo-realists
claim, regardless of how we or our neighbors feel. We are all far
surer of our eisegesis than of our exegesis when it comes to quot-
ing scripture or experience.
Something like the same line of argument could be used against
the algedonic aesthetician who cannot carry his antinomial thesis of
pleasure and pain through all the vicissitudes of life and art. be-
cause the most essential elements of the aesthetic function are aimed
at abstract qualities which are objects of contemplation and affec-
tion but not of mere pleasure or sensuous satisfaction : they aim to
hold mental contact and spiritual communion with what is positive,
active, noble, wise, beautiful, good and inspiring, and not with any-
thing that ir negative, passive, ignoble, ugly, vain, fickle or disgust-
ing. The whole field of moral aesthetic is bounded between these
adjectival limits but the substantive character of what it aims to
know and cherish demands that our affections be dynamic instead
of impotent, wise instead of foolish, and melioristic instead of spoli-
ating or decadent.
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Aesthetic morality does not leave men free to be either free-
booters or free-agents in their pursuits of art, religion, philosophy
or ethics, no one being at any time free to be vulgar, blasphemous,
foolish or criminal with impunity. Just because they escape man's
little inaccurate penalties does not mean that they have also dodged
that finer, closer-fitting dispensation which God has given them to
follow. But even for those who think they can live without the
Grace of God. there is yet to be considered the moral aesthesia of
their daily deeds and dreams. If at all active and responsible it will
give them a certain commendable pattern to follow, a certain ethical
law to abide by, and when they have either the perversity or the
cupidity to run amiss from this pattern or afoul of this law, it is
not any faidt of morality or life, but their very own if they have to
grieve or suffer. Aristotle (Eth. Nicod. iii, 1) has mentioned suf-
ficient reason why we are all subject to loves and laws, relations and
restraints we know not of, that external constraint keeps us all from
relapsing into barbarism, and that civilization would very soon come
to a sorry mess if we were all as selfish and ignorant and grasping
as we secretly want to be. The disputed question as to just what
degree our would-be free-agency is interfered with by penalties and
pains, deception and ignorance and other derelict device, is of no
serious consequence at all compared with the miserably cheap and
archaic affair our civilization would soon become if the world had
no one but fools and rogues to make up its personnel. The clever
sophists shirk and ridicule man's proper duties enough already,
without giving them more fools to victimize and fatten on.
Our future social combat will probably have to do first with dis-
sipating that moral cretinism which borders on stupidity and irre-
sponsibility when a person is incompetent from sheer neglect and
malnutrition of conscience ; when that is once well under way and
begins to give promise of man's moral redemption, we may then
expect that there will be a popular regard for that rare discrimina-
tion which sees that concupiscence and purified desire, the sensual
appetite and the amor amicifiae, are as diametrically opposite as the
poles. But it will be a hard fight to disafifect the scoundrel's wicked
emotional complex, to purge his will and crafty deeds of their spe-
cious valor, to prevent his cunning exploits from injuring or mis-
leading others. There are hopeful signs however, for right today
we are becoming suspicious of the blatant "security" and sincerity
of laws which do not guard against the rogue as well as against the
fool
; laws under the heading of Caveat Vendor, instead of Caveat
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Emptor, will give this matter closer consideration than it received
at the hands of the Romans who seemed more lenient or tolerant
and did not consider malice, fraud or bad faith as cases under dolus
mains.
But if we are really bent on assaying a full assignment of all
instruments and accessories to a common valuism for morality and
art, we cannot be too stringent on what others do, for they may
not intend to misquote their lines at all ; and anyway, if we are open
to the various suggestions of others, we may find occasional items
of original theory or practice which will prevent our valuism from
becoming specialistic and provincial. As with some of the hard-
won philosophical values of science and sociology, we might then
discover that "our rules of three for Artistrie" were after all not so
irreducible nor even so problematic as we had superficially thought
;
the real struggle having been against our own affective prejudices
and functional inertia. We should learn first of all that humanity
cannot achieve much in the way of ethical stability or social justice
until we have cultivated to some appreciable degree of power and
expression a spiritual aesthetic which is at once valid in theory and
virtuous in practice. Until this view of honest constructiveness in
all our social activities, which are based primarily on moral and
aesthetic considerations, is recognized as a prime necessity and emu-
lated as the most exemplary form of intelligent social life, we can
only expect the world to continue on its crude vulgarian course
while the derivation and defense of our valuism might aim nomi-
nally at serving an aesthetic morality, but will really be still specious
and variable. For this reason I do not think that our present pre-
carious situation in either art or morality can be relieved in the least
by our continued pursuit of the current eleutheromania (freedom-
madness) which seems to be on the verge of debauching the whole
contemporary era.
Something constructive in this direction can be realized I believe
by using control experiments to either prove our purposes worthy
and defensible or else to gradually eliminate all the antithetical
moods which thwart and mock our better nature. In either case it
will be no easy quondam affair of snap judgment and lazy Jenkins-
gestures, for if our action-patterns are properly derived and serve
us right, we will find that even philosophical speculation under test
conditions usually has to eliminate, or at least expurgate with dras-
tic energy, nearly all of our pet hypotheses before it can get rid of
the problems of the given world, and have an open field for the dis-
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covery of what is real and true. On the horderland of philosophic
departure we will be able to see the romantic irony of those two
epigrams of Pope and Heinie which read about the same, saying:
"One science only wnll our genius fit
;
So vast is art, so narrow human wit."
Real culture always starts with the individual himself making
the first venture away from his petty personal aims and wishes, out
into that larger world where duty, art, benevolence and public joy
demand that he no longer live only for his own smug selfish sake.
In more general terms it means that in order to have a real civiliza-
tion, a real cultural process pursued as a moral aesthetic and deter-
mined to achieve something ethically constructive, spiritually worthy
and socially ennobling, w-e must first have a real human aspiration
and upright desire ; second, in order to have an honest and upstand-
ing aspiration we must first have that driving sufficiency of force
known to better minds as a good and powerful conscience, the will-
to-hold-Goodness, Truth and Beauty uppermost in life and thought
;
and third, in order to have this irrepressible power of will and con-
science w^e must first have sensed in some substantial degree the
existence of a living wakeful soul within us that can serve as foun-
dation, model, plan, and finished memorial to house all our hopes
and aims and efiforts toward the meliorism of our half-profane life
in a half-holy world. But the new recruit must preserve an indi-
vidual loyalty and responsibility, and not let himself be lost in the
mad whirl of social life, else he soon find himself derelict and aban-
doned. He does well to be fascinated by the cultural adventure, but
he should watch his log and chart and compass the while he is out
a-venturing.
Cultural education is a vain mockery when it lacks the moral
atmosphere. We may be ever so industrious to build up imposing
economic organizations, work out ingenious industrial schemes, or
even produce more or less monumental works in science, philosophy
or art, but if we have brought no deliberate moral sense, no consci-
entious precision and loyalty to the ethical logistic of our activity,
to the scene of our accomplishment, what more than an idle piece
of worldliness have we put our talents to? Do we really have any
just claim on immortality or any other durable reward in such culp-
able circumstance? I hardly believe so. Even when an erstwhile
genius owes his rent and finds that he imist produce something to
recoup his dwindling fortune, regardless of beauty, use or virtue,
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any facetious phase of audacity or indubitable charm of expression
which he may happily strike upon will not redeem his default of the
moral pledge. Any such subterfuge would mean that his livelihood
was made in pretense of some phase of culture and art, that he had
cast off the burden of moral restraint in favor of mere vendibility
or other vulgar patronage, and that he seeks to please a question-
able clientele already wayward and incorrigible. All such despicable
treachery to cultural education, ever since the monthly paydays of
Protagoras and Gorgias. has been the rhyomist's perennial refuge,
a damp and dreadful dugout where he can find false security from
the fatal judgment of Time and the truer critics of valid motivation.
I cannot see, for the life of me, how any sane responsible genius
can find any inspiration for his art in soliloquies from sophistry's
salon, in dishabille and procuration.
But, however this condition may be caused or remedied, it re-
mains a fact that the critical values follow rather than precede the
cultural values whether the particular field of action be that of phil-
osophy and art or religion and morality. Accordingly then, we must
recognize first that cultural education in its full significance does not
mean only a bare intellectual refinement or vocational instruction,
but comprises also those various contacts with the aesthetic and
spiritual world as will make for introstruction and ennoblement
through the clear understanding and spontaneous practice of relig-
ious, moral, social and other inter-ethical principles. With this well
in mind we will then recognize and accept the fact that our truer
life as intelligent social beings depends upon a more virtuous valu-
ism than is ever argued by the rhyomistic rogue or foolish hedonist.
Some people do not seem to think that neither morality nor art
would be possible were it not for a staunch and strenuous sincerity
in just this sort of cultural education, that it even includes passional
reclamation and the rebalancing of lost powers in motive-choice and
actional discrimination, such being the physical approach to the affec-
tive relay of the secondary moral influences in any real or honestly
cultural exertion. Take away the necessary function of any organ-
ized procedure and its structure will soon degenerate and atrophy
;
take away the cultural values which label the function of morality
and art in human life and see how soon the social structure degener-
ates, see how soon the critical values become decadent with false
argument if not in time debauched also with downright delinquency
and every other derelict device of sophistry and spoliation.
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Such a resolution and reconstitution of our aesthetic vaUiism
does not afford us any thaumaturgy of absokite morahty or implas-
tic art-creation ; but it should aitord us new and juster grounds for
understanding our proper limitations and doing our proper duties
relative to both morality and art. Both conscience and creative
power should be the primary attributes of every bonafide artistic
genius, and having these he can go on toward his chosen work w'ith
confidence that he will not fall far short of the ethical as well as cul-
tural influence demanded of his artistic accomplishments. If noth-
ing more it would serve him as a philosophical refuge where he
could retire from the mad usury of the moiling world and there
preserve his own mtegrity and innocence safe and secure from any
umbrage or intrusion. Under pain of this apparently forced asceti-
cism the most fundamental cultural discrimination. I might say, is
that of the noble-minded and conscientious genius who has the
world's aesthetic welfare at heart but fears for its moral probity, and
therefore takes great care to forestall all vendible values or inter-
pretations being put upon his art by choosing only those vehicles of
expression, feeling, thought or action-pattern as will best serve the
spirit and the symbolism of his high affective purpose. In this more
or less fond resort he will prove himself an exacting connoisseur
of pure aesthetic motives, a consecrated spirit whose membership
in that august society of affective thinkers who think in hemispheres
proves that he is by nature fitted to think in terms of cosmic truth
and act in terms of humanitarian love and benediction. Even
though he belonged to a group of thinkers such as the New Eng-
land Transcendentalists and could achieve only a naive realization
of the extent to which his efforts were aesthetically cultural upon
society at large, could we justly deny him the solace of our sym-
pathy or the sanction of our supporting patronage simply because
he could not prophesy for us the full course of his art's development?
The fault for such a gross misunderstanding would rest with us,
and not with him.
Aesthetic morality is a delicate subject. That is. it bears many
possibilities of delicate discrimination regarding human nature, cul-
ture, character, and motivation. There are even great and pro-
nounced dift'erences between masculine and feminine opinion as to
what constitutes truth, reality, justice, wisdom, honor, virtue and
beauty. Men, however, are the born philosophers for they live
objective lives and long ago learned to test everything according to
objective valuation. Women are the born companions and exem-
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plars for they are forever occupied with subjective interests and
supply new problematic thrills when man has wearied of his strug-
gle with the hard external world. ]\Ian's sense of beauty rests in
cosmic truth while woman's lies in cosmetic imitation. ]\Ian wants
his wisdom, truth and beauty adorned with various ornaments and
symbols, but woman never recognizes them until they are about half-
naked from intensive adaptation and analysis. The situation is an-
other fairly representative instance of the contrast between amplia-
tive and categorical judgments, and no attempt to present a philo-
sophical conception of the moralism of art can be considered a valid
procedure unless it gives some attention to their differing valuations
of the esthete's peirastic ideal.
Ampliative judgments in morality and art are not limited to bare
testimony out of the subject alone, to the bare elements of knowl-
edge or experience which are elicited only through analysis of the
subject in hand. They look beyond the empirical dative, trying to
read some clear supplementary message of the loves and laws, rela-
tions and lestraints, ethical influences and compound social func-
tions which are additional predications of fact or act not to be found
immediately from bare examination or analysis of the subject. Thus,
private morality may spring from a live and dominant conscience in
the individual, but its full value and understanding by anyone else
involves comparison and appreciation in conjunction with the moral
code of society, the morality which is a product of the various con-
sciences of others. It cannot operate as self-sufficient or solipsistic
because its operation takes place in a public organism whose best
interests are not served by any form of selfish individualism how-
ever clever or domineering. So too with activities in pursuit of art,
the immediate aesthetic inspiration or delight may be fairly limited
to subjective receipt and function, but we can predicate many addi-
tional featuies as soon as we look at it as one member only in the
whole field of human culture and spiritual expression. In this
larger aspect all the functions of artistic genius are seen to have
greater honors, nobler aims, and more profound cultural values. No
educated mind is sufficiently naive to give purely analytical judg-
ment on anv subject : it knows too many items of antral relationship
to hold itself down to any such logical naivete. This indicates why
there is a whole psychology textbook full of arguments to prove that
value-judgments are always synthetic, always ampliative, because
the human mind cannot help casting them in retrospect of experience
in other fields of knowledge and cultural endeavor.
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Still it is just this empirical ground which is most often ques-
tioned by the philosophers of "pure" aesthetics, asking whether it
is a valid hypothesis on which to hang all the laws and prophets of
art. \Mth them, purity of judgment means affirmation of what is
innate or substantive only, giving no thought or attention to what
is acquisitive or ampliative. And if we only assume that our empiri-
cal preclusion from any certain subject is just and complete, then
we too can agree that our judgments on that subject can be made
similarly affirmative and "pure." Unfortunately however, neither
moralitv nor art can very honestly or consistently be considered sub-
ject to any empirical preclusion on our part, although they do very
often suffer for our ignorance and incompetence. Categorical judg-
ments, with Aristotle, were always affirmative ; mere negative find-
ings do not justify changing or replacing any judgment which is
first posited as covering a whole positive or categorical series. And,
being always affirmative of the first primary and absolute signifi-
cance, a categorical judgment will always affirm what is entitial.
innate and substantive. It will have no sympathy to share with the
connotative valuism which seeks the supplementary company of sec-
ondary functions, the conditional and relational significance of
things, for in its viewpoint all attribution and implication are adjec-
tival procedures, and in such measure they are adulterous and im-
pure. The Hegelians and neo-Aristotelians even go further, saying
that under the "new logic" also of evolutionary formulae and evo-
lutionistic debate from Spencer to Bergson the nature of valid
thought is not altered when its modus operandi only is changed or
revised. The same subject can have various functions, aims or
moods without in the least becoming a different subject. Diversity
of outward form or aspect does not necessarily indicate any essen-
tial diversity of inward nature or disposition. The categorical judg-
ment, then, remains the same whether it applies to a static or
dvnamic, a conservative or a progressive series. It is made siin-
plicitcr and has no homage due to the varying fortunes of external
relations or conditional w^elfare ; otherwise it would not be categori-
cal or substantive, but merely hypothetical, adjectival and predi-
cative.
Here then are the two great dialectic adversaries face to face
in the arena of morality and art. The anxiety that some sort of
common valuism for l^oth these zones of human cultural achievement
should be arrived at, has turned into the anxiety Tnay. the appre-
hensive dread!) that they are apt to be smothered and mangled
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beyond all recognition under the mad stampede of Kantian ration-
alism, Hegelian terminology, and logical psychologism. But no ; not
so callously do I intend to abandon either subject to such undeserved
disaster for either under cold Kantian categorical absolutes or on
top of hot Bergsonian elans et nerf-fevres I am afraid the moral
aesthetic would soon take sick and fare no better than the romantic
morality of Schiller or Swinburne.
